We study a basic private estimation problem: each of n users draws a single i.i.d. sample from an unknown Gaussian distribution, and the goal is to estimate the mean of this Gaussian distribution while satisfying local differential privacy for each user. Informally, local differential privacy requires that each data point is individually and independently privatized before it is passed to a learning algorithm. Locally private Gaussian estimation is therefore difficult because the data domain is unbounded : users may draw arbitrarily different inputs, but local differential privacy nonetheless mandates that different users have (worst-case) similar privatized output distributions.
Introduction
Differential privacy is a formal algorithmic guarantee that no single input has a large effect on the output of a computation. Since its introduction [13] over a decade ago, a rich line of work has made differential privacy a compelling privacy guarantee (see Dwork et al. [14] and Vadhan [26] for surveys), and deployments of differential privacy now exist at many organizations, including Apple [3] , Google [6, 15] , Microsoft [11] , Mozilla [4] , and the US Census Bureau [1, 22] .
Much recent attention, including almost all industrial deployments, has focused on a stronger variant of differential privacy called local differential privacy [16, 21, 27] . In the local model private data is distributed across many users, and each user privatizes their data before the data is collected by an analyst. Thus, as any locally differentially private computation runs on already-privatized data, data contributors need not worry about compromised data analysts or insecure communication channels. In contrast, (global) differential privacy assumes that the data analyst has trusted access to the unprivatized data. As a result, under global differential privacy any violation of this trust may lead to serious privacy loss for the users contributing the data.
However, the stronger privacy guarantees of the local model come at a price: for many problems, "good" solutions under local privacy require far more samples than similarly good solutions under global privacy [21] . Moreover, many problems remain little-understood under local differential privacy. In this paper, we study the simple problem of locally private Gaussian estimation: given n users each holding an i.i.d. draw from an unknown Gaussian distribution N (µ, σ 2 ), can one accurately estimate the mean µ while guaranteeing local differential privacy for each user?
One challenge of this problem is that, since data is drawn from a Gaussian, there is no a priori (worst-case) bound on the scale of the observations. Naive applications of standard privatization methods like Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms that add noise proportional to the worst-case scale of the data are therefore infeasible. Second, it is desirable to limit the number of rounds of interaction between users and the data analyst, as protocols requiring many rounds of user-analyst interaction are difficult to implement.
Our Contributions
We divide our solution to locally private Gaussian estimation into two cases. In the first case, σ is known to the analyst, and in the second case σ is unknown but bounded in known σ min ≤ σ ≤ σ max . For each case, we provide adaptive two-round and nonadaptive one-round sequentially interactive protocols. Hhere sequential interactivity informally means that no user outputs information more than once (see Section 2 for details). Informal guarantees for these protocols appear below. ) and σ is known. Then 1. Adaptive two-round protocol KVGausstimate satisfies (ε, 0)-local differential privacy for x 1 , . . . , x n and, with probability at least 1 − β, outputsμ such that
2. Nonadaptive one-round protocol 1RoundKVGausstimate satisfies (ε, 0)-local differential privacy for x 1 , . . . , x n and, with probability at least 1 − β, outputsμ such that Adaptive two-round protocol UVGausstimate satisfies (ε, 0)-local differential privacy for x 1 , . . . , x n and, with probability at least 1 − β, outputsμ such that
2. Nonadaptive one-round protocol 1RoundUVGausstimate satisfies (ε, 0)-local differential privacy for x 1 , . . . , x n and, with probability at least 1 − β, outputsμ such that
Moreover, we show in the following (informal) information-theoretic lower bound that these upper bounds are tight up to logarithmic factors. Our proof relies on techniques from the strong data-processing inequality literature [7, 23] . 
Related Work
Several works have already studied differentially private versions of various statistical tasks, especially in the global setting. Both Karwa and Vadhan [20] and Kamath et al. [19] are relevant, as they consider similar versions of Gaussian estimation under global differential privacy, respectively in the one-dimensional and high-dimensional cases. For both the known and unknown variance cases, Karwa and Vadhan [20] offer an
log(1 β) n + poly log(1 β) εn
accuracy upper bound for estimating µ. Our upper and lower bounds thus demonstrate that local privacy adds a roughly √ n accuracy cost for estimating µ. In local differential privacy, several recent works have studied related statistical tasks like identity and independence testing [2, 17, 24] , albeit restricted to discrete distributions. In concurrent work, Gaboardi et al. [18] also study Gaussian estimation under local differential privacy. They provide an adaptive two-round protocol in the known variance case and an adaptive O log R σ min -round protocol in the unknown variance case, where R upper bounds both µ and σ max and both protocols are approximately locally private. In our case, R may be as large asΩ 2 nε 2 , leading to
) round complexity for their unknown variance protocol.
In comparison, we construct adaptive two-round and nonadaptive one-round purely locally private protocols improving on these guarantees for both cases: see Figure 1 for a detailed comparison.
Moreover, while Gaboardi et al. [18] prove an Ω σ ε log(1 β) n lower bound for nonadaptive oneround protocols, we prove a logarithmically weaker but also more general Ω σ ε 1 n lower bound for adaptive sequentially interactive protocols. Gaboardi et al. [18] also offer extensions to quantile estimation and estimation when σ lacks a known upper bound.
Our lower bounds are structurally similar to existing mutual information-based approaches [5, 12, 25] and build on recent results showing that pure and approximate local differential privacy are "equivalent" [8, 10] . Our lower bound also uses tools from the strong data processing inequality literature [7, 23] ; broader application of these techniques to local differential privacy may be of independent interest. Gaboardi et al. [18] This Work Setting Accuracy Rounds Accuracy Rounds
Figure 1: A comparison of upper bounds presented in Gaboardi et al. [18] and our work. In all cases, Gaboardi et al. [18] use (ε, δ)-locally private algorithms while we use (ε, 0). Here, R denotes an upper bound on both µ and σ. In our setting, R =Õ(2
), leading the unknown variance protocol of Gaboardi et al. [18] to round complexity potentially as large asÕ(nε 2 ).
Preliminaries
We consider a setting in which each user i ∈ [n] has private data consisting of a single i.i.d. draw from an unknown Gaussian distribution,
). In our communication protocol, users may exchange messages over public channels with a single (possibly untrusted) central analyst 1 . The analyst's task is to accurately estimate µ while guaranteeing local differential privacy for each user.
We restrict our attention to sequentially interactive protocols, where every user sends at most a single message to the analyst in the entire protocol. For simplicity, our definition of sequentially interactive protocols is slightly less general than the one introduced by Duchi et al. [12] (see Section 5 for details). The algorithms we present for our upper bounds all satisfy our more restrictive notion of sequential interactivity, while our lower bounds apply to the more general notion used by Duchi et al. [12] .
We also study the round complexity of these interactive protocols. Formally, one round of interaction in a protocol consists of the following two steps: 1) the analyst selects a subset of users S ⊆ [n], along with a set of randomizers {Q i i ∈ S}, and 2) each user i in S computes a message y i = Q i (x i ) using the assigned function Q i and sends the message to the analyst.
Differential Privacy
Informally, a randomized algorithm is differentially private if arbitrarily changing a single input does not change the output distribution "too much". The resulting computation preserves privacy because the output distribution is insensitive to any change of a single user's data. More formally:
m that differ by a single observation, the following holds for any event S ⊆ R,
Here, we study a stronger privacy guarantee called local differential privacy. In the local model, each user i computes their message using a local randomizer. A local randomizer is a differentially private algorithm taking single-element databases as input. More formally, a randomized function
A sequentially interactive protocol is locally private if every user computes their message using a local randomizer. Definition 2.2. A sequentially interactive protocol A is (ε, δ)-locally private for private user data {x 1 , . . . , x n } if, for every user i ∈ [n], the message Y i for every user i is computed using an (ε, δ)-local randomizer Q i . When δ > 0, we say A is approximately locally private. If δ = 0, A is purely locally private.
Known Variance
In this section, we present two solutions for the setting where the variance σ 2 is known (shorthanded "KV"). In Section 3.1, we analyze an adaptive protocol KVGausstimate that requires two rounds of analyst-user interaction. In Section 3.2, we analyze a nonadaptive protocol 1Round-KVGausstimate achieving a weaker accuracy guarantee in a single round.
Two-round protocol
We begin with a high-level overview of KVGausstimate before analyzing its components in detail. In KVGausstimate, the analyst splits the n users into halves U 1 and U 2 , employing users from U 1 to compute an initial estimate of µ and then users from U 2 to further refine this estimate.
More concretely, the analyst partitions
, where β is the desired failure probability. The analyst then solicits (a privatized version of) ⌊x i 2 j ⌋ mod 4 from each user in subgroup U j 1 . Each user responds by calling RR1, and the analyst aggregates these estimates through KVAgg1. By doing so, the analyst effectively executes a one-round binary search and obtains an initial O(σ)-accurate estimateμ 1 of µ.
The analyst then passesμ 1 to users in U 2 and solicits user estimates using (a privatized version of) a de-meaning protocol from the distributed statistical estimation literature [7] . Users in U 2 respond by calls to KVRR2, where each user i de-means their point usingμ 1 , standardizes it using σ, and randomized responds on sgn((x i −μ 1 ) σ). Crucially, this de-meaning relies on knowing an O(σ)-accurate estimate ofμ, which necessitates the first estimateμ 1 . The analyst then uses KVAgg2 to aggregate these responses into an estimate of the CDF of N (µ, σ 2 ), from which the analyst can finally back out a final estimateμ 2 . Pseudocode for KVGausstimate appears below. Throughout, we make the following assumptions on our problem parameters, deferring exact constants to the analysis. For neatness, let
for user i ∈ U j 1 do
3:
User i outputsỹ i ← RR1(ε, i, j)
4:
end for 5: end for ⊳ End of round 1
User i outputsỹ i ← KVRR2(ε, i,μ 1 , σ) 10: end for ⊳ End of round 2
We start our analysis with a privacy guarantee.
Theorem 3.2. KVGausstimate satisfies (ε, 0)-local differential privacy for x 1 , . . . , x n .
Proof. As KVGausstimate is sequentially interactive, each user only produces one output. It therefore suffices to show that each randomized response routine used in KVGausstimate is (ε, 0)-locally private. In RR1, for any possible inputs x, x ′ and output y we have
so RR1 is (ε, 0)-locally private. KVRR2 is (ε, 0)-locally private by similar logic.
Next, we recall our overall accuracy result for KVGausstimate.
Theorem 3.3. With probability at least 1 − β, KVGausstimate outputs an estimateμ 2 such that
We prove this result by analyzing the execution of KVGausstimate in sequence below.
Round one
We start with KVGausstimate's first round of interaction. First, each user i in group U j 1 runs RR1(ε, i, j) to publish an ε-privatized versionỹ i of y i = ⌊x i 2 j ⌋ mod 4. Note that below p ∼ U X denotes a uniform random draw p from set X.
User i publishesỹ i ← y i 4: else
5:
User i publishesỹ i ∼ u ({0, 1, 2, 3} {y i }) 6 : end if Output: Private user estimateỹ i of µ(j)
Since these randomized responses contain information about users' local estimates of each bit of µ, the analyst uses KVAgg1(ε, k, L, U 1 ) to aggregate them into histogramĤ 1 .
for a ∈ {0, 1} do 3:
end for 6: end for 7: OutputĤ Output: Aggregated histogramĤ of private user responses Let H 1 be the "true" histogram, H j 1 (a) = {y i i ∈ U j 1 , y i = a} for all a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and j ∈ L. Since the analyst only has access toĤ 1 , we need to show thatĤ 1 and H 1 are similar.
Lemma 3.4. With probability at least 1 − β, for all j ∈ L,
, so by a pair of Chernoff bounds on the k users in U j 1 , with probability at least 1 − β 4L,
where the last step uses
e ε −1 < ε+4 ε . Union bounding over a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} and all L groups U j 1 completes the proof.
Next, we show how the analyst usesĤ 1 to estimate µ through EstMean1. Intuitively, in subgroup U j 1 when user responses concentrate in a single bin mod 4, this suggests that µ lies in the corresponding bin. In the other direction, when user responses do not concentrate in a single bin, users with points near µ must spread out over multiple bins, suggesting that µ lies near the boundary between bins. We formalize this intuition in EstMean1 and Lemma 3.5.
Algorithm 4 EstMean1
Input:
Analyst computes integer c such that c2 j ∈ I j and c ≡ M 1 (j) mod 4 6:
Conditioned on the success of the preceding lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,
Proof. Recall the definitions of ψ, M 1 (j), and M 2 (j) from the pseudocode for EstMean1:
. We start by proving two useful claims.
Claim 1: With probability at least 1−β 5, for all j ∈ L where 2
all haveĤ
Then for any a ≡ ⌊µ 2
where the second inequality uses 2 j > σ. Thus by a binomial Chernoff bound, the assumption k > 5000 ln(5L β), and Lemma 3.4, with probability ≥ 1 − β 5L,Ĥ j 1 (a) < 0.52k + ψ. Therefore if for some a we haveĤ Claim 2: Let j be the maximum j ∈ L withĤ j 1 (M 1 (j)) < 0.52k + ψ, and let c * be the maximum integer such that c * 2
> σ, then with probability at least
, by another application of the Gaussian
Thus by the same method as above, using the assumption k > 5000 ln(5 β), with probability at least 1 − β 5,Ĥ j 1 (c mod 4) ≥ 0.33k − ψ. By similar logic, since
with probability at least 1 − β 5,Ĥ
so with probability at least 1 − β 5
where the middle inequality uses k > 625
) then by similar logic with probability at least 1 − β 5Ĥ
It follows that with probability at least 1 − 3β 5 in all cases c ≡ M 1 (j) or M 2 (j) mod 4. Moreover, by a similar application of the Gaussian CDF, one of c − 1 mod 4 and c + 1 mod 4 lies in {M 1 (j), M 2 (j)} as well.
Recalling that c * is the maximum integer such that c * 2 j ∈ I j and c
). In the first case,
so with probability at least 1
In the second case,
and with probability at least 1 − β 5,Ĥ
Thus c * 2 j − µ ≤ 2σ. We put these facts together in EstMean1 as follows: let j 1 be the maximum element of L such thatĤ
Thus in all cases, with probability at least 1 − β, μ 1 − µ ≤ 2σ.
Round two
The results above give the analyst an (initial) estimateμ 1 such that μ 1 − µ ≤ 2σ. Now, the analyst passes this estimateμ 1 to users i ∈ U 2 , and each user usesμ 1 to de-mean their value x i and randomized respond on the resulting (x i −μ 1 ) σ in KVRR2.
User i publishesỹ i ← y i 6: else
7:
User i publishesỹ i ← −y i 8: end if Output: Private de-meaned user estimateỹ i
De-meaning thus effectively transforms the problem of estimating µ into the problem of estimating µ when µ is small. This in turn enables us to use techniques for estimating the CDF near µ (specifically, a private version of Protocol 2 in Braverman et al. [7] ).
4: end for 5: Analyst outputsĤ Output: Aggregated histogramĤ of private user responses We now prove that this de-meaning process results in a more accurate final estimateμ 2 of µ. Lemma 3.6. Conditioned on the success of the previous lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β KVGausstimate outputsμ 2 such that
Proof. The proof is broadly similar to that of Theorem B.1 in Braverman et al. [7] , with some modifications for privacy. First, by Lemma 3.
2) (note that we are analyzing the unprivatized values y i to start; later, we will use this analysis to prove the analogous result for the privatized valuesỹ i ).
A Chernoff bound on [−1, 1]-bounded random variables then shows that, with probability at least 1 − β 2, for y = 2 n ∑ i∈U 2 y i we have
Using n > 20000 ln(4 β) we get 2 ln(4 β) n < 0.01 and erf( √ 2) < 0.96, so y ≤ 0.97 and thus y < erf(1.6). Let M be an upper bound on the Lipschitz constant for erf
Then for any x, y ∈ [−0.97, 0.97] we have erf It remains to analyze the privatized values {ỹ i } and bound T −T , recalling that we set
. By a Chernoff bound analogous to that of Lemma 3.4, with probability at least 1−β 2
Using n > 20000 
Therefore by the triangle inequality
and by σμ = µ −μ 1 we get
Thus by takingμ 2 = σT +μ 1 , we get
One-round protocol
In this section, we provide a nonadaptive version 1RoundKVGausstimate of the protocol above. Recall from the previous section that KVGausstimate uses its first pool of users U 1 to estimate µ, and then passes this estimateμ 1 to its second pool of users U 2 to compute a more accurate estimateμ 2 of µ. At a high level, 1RoundKVGausstimate executes these two rounds of KVGausstimate simultaneously by parallelization. More concretely, 1RoundKVGaussti-mate splits its second user pool U 2 into Θ( log(n)) subgroups and has each subgroup run the second-round protocol from KVGausstimate with different values ofμ 1 . Intuitively, as most users draw points clustered within O(σ log(n)), it suffices that these clustered users de-mean using a "good" guess for µ. Doing this naively would require Ω(2 Lmax σ log(n)) subgroups to ensure that at least one subgroup de-means usingμ that is O(σ log(n)) close to µ. However, we can do better by leveraging the aforementioned clustering and using σ log(n) as a modulus. We do this by associating with each subgroup U j 2 a set of points S(j) interspersed O(σ log(n)) apart on the real line and having user i ∈ U j 2 de-mean using the point in S(j) closest to theirs. By defining these sets S(j) carefully, we can guarantee that at least one group has most of its users de-mean using a point near µ.
These two processes come together as folows: at the end of the single round, the analyst aggregates the responses from users in U 1 to compute an estimateμ 1 of µ. By comparingμ 1 and S(j), the analyst then selects the subgroup U j 2 where, with high probability, most users de-meaned using a value in S(j) close toμ 1 . This mimics the effect of adaptively passingμ 1 to the users in U 2 at the rough cost of a log 1 4 (n) factor in accuracy, which results from splitting U 2 into approximately log(n) groups. Pseudocode for 1RoundKVGausstimate appears below. We start with the (slightly stronger) assumptions 1RoundKVGausstimate requires. 1RoundKVGausstimate's privacy guarantee follows from the same analysis of randomized response as in KVGausstimate, so we state the guarantee but omit its proof.
Theorem 3.8. 1RoundKVGausstimate satisfies (ε, 0)-local differentially privacy for x 1 , . . . , x n .
Next, we recall our overall accuracy result for 1RoundKVGausstimate. Theorem 3.9. With probability at least 1 − β, 1RoundKVGausstimate outputs an estimateμ 2 such that
We define k (here denoted k 1 ), L, U 1 , and U 2 as in KVGausstimate. As 1RoundKVGaussti-mate's treatment of users in U 1 is identical to that of KVGausstimate, we skip its analysis, instead recalling its final guarantee: Lemma 3.10. With probability at least 1 − β, μ 1 − µ ≤ 2σ.
3:
4:
end for 5: end for 6: for j ∈ R do 7: for user i ∈ U j 2 do 8:
end for 10: end for ⊳ End of round 1
This brings us to U 2 , and we define new parameters as follows. For neatness, let ρ = ⌈2 ln(4n)⌉ ≥ ⌈ 2 ln(2 √ n) + 2.1⌉ for n ≥ 32. We set R = {0.2σ, 0.4σ, . . . , ρσ} and split U 2 into R = 5ρ groups indexed by j ∈ R, each of size k 2 ≥ ⌊n 2 R ⌋ ≥ ⌊ n 20 ln(4n) ⌋ = Ω(n log(n)), where the last inequality uses n ≥ 25. Finally, for each j ∈ R we define S(j) = {j + bρσ b ∈ Z}.
With this setup, for each j ∈ R each user i ∈ U j 2 uses 1RoundKVRR2 to execute a groupspecific version of KVRR2: rather than de-meaning byμ 1 as in KVRR2, user i now de-means by the nearest point in S(j) (breaking ties arbitrarily).
Algorithm 8 1RoundKVRR2
Input: ε, i, S(j)
Then by a binomial Chernoff bound
so using n ≥ 9 ln( R β) 2 and union bounding over R = Ω( log(n)) groups, the claim follows.
In particular, this implies that for j * = arg min j * ∈R min s∈S(j * ) s −μ 1 (i.e., the group with element of S(j * ) closest toμ 1 ), most users draw points in [µ − σ ln(4n), µ + σ ln(4n)]. Let s * = min s∈S(j * ) s −μ 1 . Our final accuracy result will rely on two facts. First, most users in U j * 2 de-mean using s * . Second, the randomized responses of users who de-mean with s * are "almost as good" as if they were de-meaned by µ.
Lemma 3.12. Conditioned on the success of the previous lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β, 1RoundKVGausstimate outputsμ 2 such that
Proof. Because adjacent points in R are 0.2σ apart, s * −μ 1 ≤ 0.1σ. Lemma 3.10 and the triangle inequality then imply that s * − µ ≤ 2.1σ. This enables us to mimic the proof of Lemma 3.6,
We can decompose users in U j * 2 into those with points within σρ of s * and those with more distant points. Denote the first set of users by V and the second set by V c , and recall that the Gaussian CDF is
Then, letting 1 denote the indicator function,
where the last step uses the fact that erf is an odd function. Since erf(x) =
where the second inequality relies on e −x being monotone decreasing and the last step uses n > 20, which implies ρ − 2.1 ≥ ln(4n). Then using n ≥ 3k 2 we get 3e
Next, as s * − µ ≤ 2.1σ, users having points within σ 2 ln(2 √ n) of µ have points within σρ of s * .
The Gaussian tail bound from Lemma 3.11 then implies
, and by the above bound on P [x ∈ V c ] and
A Chernoff bound on {−1, 1}-valued random variables then tells us that, for y = 1 k 2 ∑ i∈U j * 2 y i , with probability at least 1 − β 2 we have
Combining the three numbered equations above with the triangle inequality yields 
It remains to bound T −T , where T is the (unknown) aggregation of unprivatized {y i } whileT is the (known) aggregation of privatized {ỹ i }. By a Chernoff bound analogous to that of Lemma 3.4, with probability at least 1 − β 2 
and by σμ = µ − s * we get
Thus by takingμ 2 = σT + s * and substituting in k 2 = Ω(n log(n)) we get
Unknown Variance
In this section, we consider the more general problem where σ is unknown but bounded by some interval σ min ≤ σ ≤ σ max .
Two-round protocol
Our adaptive solution, UVGausstimate, uses two rounds. In round one, the analyst solicits user estimates for σ and µ, and in round two the analyst passes these estimates to another set of users to refine the estimate of µ. Accordingly, our protocol begins by halving the users into groups U 1 (to obtain O(σ)-accurate estimates of σ and µ in the first round) and U 2 (to refine the initial estimate of µ in the second round).
We start by describing U 1 , the group of users estimating σ and µ. We split
(as in Section 3, we defer constants to the analysis).
Next, we leave U 2 as n 2 users without subgroups. All users in U 2 receive (via the analyst) estimateσ andμ from U 1 and use these estimates to compute a final estimateμ 2 with Laplace noise. Roughly, we employ Laplace noise rather than the de-meaning process used in the known variance case because in the unknown variance case we lack the precise (O(σ √ n)-accurate) estimate of σ that correctly de-meaning requires. Throughout, we require the following assumption on our problem parameters. 
3:
4:
Analyst computes I ← [μ 1 −σ(2 + ln(4n)),μ 1 +σ(2 + ln(4n))] 11: for user i ∈ U 2 do
12:
User i outputsỹ i ← UVRR2(ε, i, I) 13: end for ⊳ End of round 1 14: Analyst outputsμ 2 ← 2 n ∑ i∈U 2ỹ i Output: Analyst estimateμ 2 of µ We begin our analysis with overall privacy and accuracy guarantees. Theorem 4.2. UVGausstimate satisfies (ε, 0)-local differentially privacy for x 1 , . . . , x n .
Proof. As we already proved that RR1 is private in Section 3.1, we are left with UVRR2. To prove that UVRR2 is (ε, 0)-locally differentially private as well, we can use a standard Laplace noise privacy guarantee (see e.g. Theorem 3.6 in Dwork et al. [14] ): given function f with 1-sensitivity ∆f , computing f (x) + Lap (∆f ε) satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy. Theorem 4.3. With probability at least 1 − β, UVGausstimate outputs an estimateμ 2 such that
First, for each j ∈ L 1 each user i in group U The analyst aggregates responses from users in U 1 in two ways. First, the analyst computes a collection of histogramsĤ 1 using Agg1.Ĥ 1 is an estimate of the "true" histogram collection, H j (a) = {y i i ∈ U j 1 , y i ∈ {a, a + 1 mod 4}} for all j ∈ L 1 . As in Lemma 3.4, we can show thatĤ 1 and H 1 are similar. As the proof is nearly identical, we omit it.
Lemma 4.4. With probability at least 1 − β, for all j ∈ L 1 ,
for a = 0, 1, 2, 3 do 3:
Analyst computesĤ
5: end for 6: for a = 0, 1, 2, 3 do Next, the analyst uses randomized responses from U 1 to compute an initial estimateμ 1 of µ. As the process EstMean1 is identical to that used in KVGausstimate up to a different subgroup range L 1 , we skip its description and only recall its guarantee: Lemma 4.6. Conditioned on the success of the preceding lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,
From the results above, the analyst obtains an estimateσ such thatσ ∈ [σ, 8σ] and an estimatê µ 1 such that μ 1 − µ ≤ 2σ. The analyst now uses these to compute interval I = [μ 1 −σ(2 + ln(4n)),μ 1 +σ(2 + ln(4n))], where I is intentionally constructed to (with high probability) contain the points of Ω(n) users. The analyst then passes I to users in U 2 . Users in U 2 respond with noisy responses via independent calls to UVRR2. In UVRR2, each user clips their sample x i to the interval I and reports a private versionỹ i using Laplace noise scaled to I .
At a high level, we employ Laplace noise in this way because Laplace noise requires a small interval I to be a useful privatization method: if I is large, then the Lap ( I ε) noise required for privacy will be large as well. At the same time, I must be large enough to contain the points of most users. Constructing such an I therefore requires rough estimates of both µ and σ, leading to the two-round approach used here.
Algorithm 12 UVRR2
Input: ε, i, I
1:
Output: Private version of user's point clipped to I Informally, since I contains the points of an overwhelming fraction of users, the average of noisy points clipped to I will be close to the expected average µ. The analyst can therefore average these user randomized responses to compute a more accurate final estimate of µ.
Lemma 4.7. Conditioned on the success of the previous lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β,
Proof. There are two sources of error in the analyst's estimateμ 2 = 2 n ∑ iỹi : error from the unnoised x ′ i s and error from noise inỹ i s. Specifically, recalling that U 2 = n 2, we can decomposeμ 2 aŝ
where each η i ∼ i.i.d. Lap ( I ε) and I = 2σ(2 + ln(4n)). First, using n > 4 ln(3 β) by concentration of independent Laplace random variables (see e.g. Lemma 2.8 in Chan et al. [9] ) with probability at least 1 − β 3,
This bounds the contribution of Laplace noise to overall error.
It remains to bound
Let V denote the set of users with x i ∈ I and V c denote the set of users with x i ∈ I. First, by a Gaussian tail bound, for each user i,
and using n ≥ (6 ln(2 β)) 2 3 we get 6 ln(3 β) n 3 2 ≤ 1, so with probability at least 1 − β 3, V c ≤ 2 √ n.
This bounds the contribution of error from the (unprivatized) data of users in V c . Let V denote the set of users in U 2 with points in I. We bound the error contributed by users in V in a similar way. Users in V have x ′ i = x i , so by a Chernoff bound on (shifted) [0, I ]-bounded random variables, with probability at least 1 − β 3 2 n i∈V c x
Putting these three bounds together, we get 2
where the last step usesσ ∈ [σ, 8σ] from Lemma 4.5.
One-round protocol
Here we provide a nonadaptive one-round version of UVGausstimate, 1RoundUVGaussti-mate. As in 1RoundKVGausstimate, 1RoundUVGausstimate will simulate the second round of UVGausstimate simultaneously with its first round.
More concretely, UVGausstimate constructed an interval I based on estimatesμ 1 of µ and σ of σ, passed I to users in U 2 , and users in U 2 responded with noisy versions of their points clipped to I with Lap ( I ε) noise. 1RoundUVGausstimate instead splits U 2 into subgroups, where each subgroup responds using different intervals I. As in 1RoundKVGausstimate, at the end of the single round the analyst obtains estimatesμ 1 andσ from users in U 1 , constructs an interval I from these estimates, and finds a subgroup of U 2 where most users employed an interval I ′ similar to I. This similarity guarantees that the responses from that subgroup get the same accuracy as the two-round case up to an O log σmax σ min + 1 log(n) factor. Pseudocode for 1RoundUVGausstimate appears below. 1RoundUVGausstimate's privacy guarantee follows from the same analysis of randomized response and Laplace noise as for UVGausstimate, so we omit its proof.
Theorem 4.8. 1RoundUVGausstimate satisfies (ε, 0)-local differentially privacy for x 1 , . . . , x n .
Next, we recall 1RoundUVGausstimate's accuracy guarantee before proving it below.
4:
5:
end for 6: end for
for j 2 ∈ R j 1 do
9:
for user i ∈ U j 1 ,j 2 2 do 10:
end for 12: end for 13: end for ⊳ End of round 1
Output: Analyst estimateμ 2 of µ Theorem 4.9. Wih probability at least 1 − β, 1RoundUVGausstimate outputsμ 2 such that
We define k 1 , L 1 , and U 1 , as in UVGausstimate and skip the analysis of 1RoundUVGaussti-mate's treatment of users in U 1 as it is identical to that of UVGausstimate. We recall its collected guarantee:
Lemma 4.10. With probability at least 1 − β,σ ∈ [σ, 8σ] and μ 1 − µ ≤ 2σ.
We again define R and S for U 2 , albeit with a few modifications. First, we let ρ = ⌈ ln(4n) + 6⌉ for neatness. Then, recalling from Section 4.1 that L 1 ranges over possible values of log(σ), for each j a ∈ L 1 we define R ja = {2 ja , 2 ⋅ 2 ja , . . . , ρ ⋅ 2 ja }. Next, for each j a ∈ L 1 and j b ∈ R ja , we
for each j a ∈ L 1 and j b ∈ R ja . As in 1RoundKVGausstimate, we parallelize over these subgroups to simulate the second round of UVGausstimate for different values of (j a , j b ). The assumptions required are the same as those of Assumption 4.1.
In each subgroup U ja,j b 2
, each user i computes the nearest element s i ∈ S(j a , j b ) to x i , s i = arg min s∈S(ja,j b ) x i − s and outputs x i − s i plus Laplace noise in 1RoundUVRR2. The analyst then uses estimates j 1 = ⌈log(σ)⌉ andμ 1 from U 1 to compute j 2 = arg min j∈R j 1 (min z∈S(j 1 ,j) z −μ 1 ).
Finally, the analyst aggregates randomized responses from group U
into an estimateμ 2 .
Algorithm 14 1RoundUVRR2
As in 1RoundKVGausstimate, we start with a concentration result for each U
. Since its proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.11, we omit it.
Lemma 4.11. With probability at least 1 − β, for all j 1 ∈ L 1 and j 2 ∈ R j 1 , group U
In combination with the previous lemmas, this enables us to prove our final accuracy result.
Lemma 4.12. Conditioned on the success of the previous lemmas, with probability at least 1 − β, 1RoundUVGausstimate outputsμ 2 such that
Proof. By Lemma 4.10,σ ∈ [σ, 8σ] and μ 1 − µ ≤ 2σ. Since j 1 = log(σ) ∈ L 1 and
. By Lemma 4.11 at most 2 √
have x i − µ > σ ln(4n). Thus by s * − µ < 6σ and the fact that any two points in S(j 1 , j 2 ) are at leastσρ ≥ σ(6 + ln(4n)) far apart, we get that at least k 2 − 2 √
set s i = s * in their run of 1RoundUVRR2.
Denote this subset of users by V , and denote by V c the set of users i ∈ U
such that s i ≠ s * , and
2 ), the density for N (µ, σ 2 ). Then
2 ), the antiderivative of (x − µ)f (x). Then
where the first inequality usesσ ≥ σ and s * − µ < 6σ. Similar logic implies
We can therefore decompose
where the the first inequality uses a (with probability at least 1−β 2) Chernoff bound on
k 2 , and the last step usesσ ∈ [σ, 8σ].
Next, since we can decompose
where each η i ∼ Lap (ρσ ε), the same concentration of Laplace noise from Lemma 4.7 says that with probability 1 − β 2,
Combining with the bound above and substituting in
The claim then follows fromμ
i .
Lower Bound
In this section we prove that the upper bounds proven in Sections 3 and 4 are tight up to log factors for sequentially interactive protocols. Our argument proceeds in three steps: first, in Section 5.1 we show that any protocol achieving good performance on our estimation problem achieves good performance on a more easily analyzed testing problem. Second, in Section 5.2 we prove a lower bound for (ε, 0)-locally private protocols on these testing problems. Finally, we use recent work demonstrating that noninteractive pure and approximate local privacy are "equivalent" for sequentially interactive protocols [8, 10] to generalize our lower bound to protocols satisfying (ε, δ)-local privacy.
For completeness, we start with the more general notion of sequential interactivity used by Duchi et al. [12] , which requires that the set of messages {Y i } sent by the users satisfies the following conditional independence structure:
From Estimation to Testing
We begin by defining a way to transform an instance of Estimate into a (formally) easier testing problem Test. We start by defining an instance Estimate (n, M, σ). Here, a protocol receives n samples from a N (µ, σ 2 ) distribution where σ is known, µ ∈ [0, M ], and the goal is to estimate µ. The testing problem Test (n, M, σ) is to recover v from x 1 , . . . , x n with high probability.
We will say that a protocol A (α, β)-estimates Estimate (n, M, σ) if, with probability at least 1 − β, A(Estimate (n, M, σ)) =μ such that μ − µ < α. Similarly, we will say that an algorithm A β-solves Test (n, M, σ) if, with probability at least 1 − β, A(Test (n, M, σ)) = v. We now show that Test (n, M, σ) is formally no harder than Estimate (n, M, σ).
Lemma 5.1. If there exists a sequentially interactive and (ε, δ)-locally private protocol A that (M 2, β)-estimates Estimate (n, M, σ), then there exists a sequentially interactive and (ε, δ)-locally
Proof. Let x 1 , . . . , x n be the samples from an instance of Test (n, M, σ). We define A ′ to run A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) and then output arg minμ ∈{0,M } A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) −μ . Since A (M 2, β)-estimates Estimate (n, M, σ), with probability at least 1 − β, A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) − µ < M 2. Thus with probability at least 1 − β, A ′ (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = v. Thus A ′ β-solves Test (n, M, σ). As A ′ interacted with x 1 , . . . , x n only through (ε, δ)-locally private A, by preservation of differential privacy under postprocessing, A ′ is (ε, δ)-locally private as well. Similar logic implies that A ′ is also sequentially interactive.
Lower Bounds for Test
Next, we show that Test is hard for (ε, 0)-locally private protocols. As our result uses some tools from information theory, a brief overview of information theory basics appears in the Appendix.
,where c is an absolute constant. For any sequentially interactive and (ε, 0)-locally private protocol A that β-solves Test (n, M, σ), β ≥ 1 4.
Proof. We may express any sequentially interactive (ε, 0)-locally private protocol A that β-solves Test (n, M, σ) as a Markov chain V → X → Y → Z, where V is the random variable selecting v, X = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is the random variable for users' i.i.d. samples, Y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) is the random variable for users' (ε, 0)-privatized responses, and Z = A(Test (n, M, σ)). As V → X → Y → Z is a Markov chain (i.e., any two random variables in the chain are conditionally independent given a random variable between them). Thus by a strong data processing inequality for two Gaussians (see e.g. Section 4.1 in Braverman et al. [7] or, for a broader treatment of strong data processing inequalities, Raginsky [23] ), there exists absolute constant c such that for each user i, I(V ; Y i ) ≤ 
Without loss of generality, suppose Z is a deterministic function of Y 3 . From Markov chain V → X → Y → Z and the (generic) data processing inequality we get
where the last step follows from the independence of Y i and
. Therefore by M ≤ σ 4(e ε − 1) √ 2nc we get I(V ; Z) ≤ 1 8. Define P to be the distribution of Z (over the randomness of V , X, and Y ), and let P 0 and P 1 be the distributions for Z V = 0 and Z V = 1 respectively. Then as V is uniform, P = (P 0 + P 1 ) 2, so P − P 0 1 = P − P 1 1 = . It remains to show that Test is hard for (ε, δ)-locally private protocols. Our result follows almost immediately from existing work [8, 10] showing, roughly, that any sequentially interactive (ε, δ)-locally private protocol A may be transformed into a sequentially interactive (O(ε), 0)-locally private protocol A ′ with similar behavior 4 .
Lemma 5.3. Let ε > 0 and δ < min ǫβ 48n ln(2n β) , β 16n ln(n β)e 7ε , and suppose that A is a sequentially interactive and (ε, δ)-locally private protocol. If A β-solves Test (n, M, σ), then there exists a sequentially interactive (10ε, 0)-locally private A ′ that 4β-solves Test (n, M, σ).
Proof. Our analysis splits into two cases depending on ǫ. Case 1: ε ≤ 1 4. In this case, we use a result from Bun et al. [8] , included here for completeness. Our result follows.
Lower Bound for Estimate
We combine the preceding results to prove a general lower bound for Estimate as follows: for appropriate ε and δ, by Lemma 5.1 any sequentially interactive and ( In particular, this implies that the upper bounds of Sections 3 and 4 are tight up to logarithmic factors for any sequentially interactive and (ε, δ)-locally private protocol with sufficiently small δ.
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A Information Theory
We briefly review some standard facts and definitions from information theory, starting with entropy.
Definition A.1. The entropy H(X) of a random variable X is H(X) = Next, we can use entropy to define the mutual information between two random variables. Mutual information between random variables X and Y is roughly the amount by which conditioning on Y reduces the entropy of X (and vice-versa). We also define the related notion of KL-divergence. where we often abuse notation and let X and Y denote the distributions associated with X and Y .
KL divergence connects to mutual information as follows. Finally, we will also use the following connection between KL divergence and ⋅ 1 distance.
Lemma A.5 (Pinsker's inequality). For random variables X and Y ,
